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Abstract
This paper discusses the implications of buyers and
sellers being influenced by the information they receive
and how that impacts their decision-making process in
the context of a high-value low-frequency transaction
(HVLFT). Using an exploratory case study, we explore
a dark dimension of knowledge where tacit or explicit
knowledge has been lost, distorted, suppressed,
misrepresented, or misappropriated resulting in
ambiguity and increased risk in decision making. The
case study focuses on the decision-making process and
the information flow seen from the perspective of
different stakeholders involved in a HVLFT. Based on
this case study we propose, articulate, and apply a
model that explicitly acknowledges the dark side of
knowledge. Our findings suggest the need for the
application of convergent technologies to ameliorate
the risk and asymmetricity caused by the dark side of
knowledge and enhance governance particularly in the
context of HVLFT.

1. Introduction
In a commercial setting, the dark side of knowledge
has been widespread and has existed ever since we have
been trading goods. There has always been tension
between profit and honesty. This tension often leads to
the misuse of asymmetric information between a seller
and a buyer [1]. In a high-value low-frequency
transaction (HVLFT), we are committing a large part of
our financial wealth to an asset that we may only buy or
sell a few times in our lifetime. The low-frequency
means that a buyer is per definition a novice buyer and
cannot leverage his decision making on past
experiences. [4]. The HVLFT can have a lifelong
financial impact on a buyer that is unaware of the risk
associated with the purchase. Also, the decision-making
process of a buyer is affected by a HVLFT. This
decision- making process could be compared to asking
a person to walk across a board laid down on a livingroom floor (i.e. regular transaction) and then asking
them to repeat that same feat but suspending that same
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plank across a canyon with a 100-meter drop on both
sides (i.e. HVLFT).
To support the decision-making process of a novice
buyer we propose the TEX model [25, 26], adding a
dimension to the classic tacit and explicit divide of
information [11]. The TEX Model has been used as a
guide in our case study, whilst interviewing 31
participants in the New Zealand (NZ) real estate
industry.

2. Knowledge Management
Knowledge management is often viewed as the
interaction among people, process, and technology. This
interaction is frequently portrayed in a firm setting.
Brooking [5] advances a broader view and defines
knowledge management as the approach we manage
human-centred assets. Its function is to guard and grow
knowledge owned by individuals, and where possible,
transfer the assets into a form where they can be more
readily shared by others. The crux of the theory is to
devise different strategies to capture the tacit knowledge
from individuals and convert them into explicit
knowledge, making them readily available and
transferable to many [32].

2.1 Tacit and Explicit Knowledge
The distinction between tacit and explicit
knowledge is a fundamental concept in knowledge
management [11]. It was first purported by Polanyi [42],
“we know more than we can tell.” The difference
between tacit and explicit is also acknowledged by
Alavi and Leidner [2]. Nonaka and Takeuchi [41] define
tacit knowledge as “personal knowledge embedded in
individual experience and involves intangible factors
such as personal beliefs, perspective and value
systems.” Explicit knowledge is the converse of tacit
knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be expressed in
code and is not subject to multiple interpretations, while
tacit knowledge can be subdivided into knowledge that
has not been formalised and knowledge that cannot be
formalised. Hedesstrom and Whitley [23] emphasise
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that once knowledge has been formalised, it becomes
explicit. This is further extrapolated by Nonaka and
Takeuchi [41] in their SECI model showing the
complexity of coding tacit knowledge into explicit
knowledge. Dalkir [11] furthermore posits that the
primary division in knowledge is between tacit and
explicit knowledge. However, Collins [10] notes that
tacit knowledge is a relative concept: what is easily
articulated by one person may be very difficult to
externalise by another. Thus, the same content may be
explicit for one person and tacit for another. Underlying
the terminologies of tacit and explicit knowledge there
is a plethora of literature referring to implicit
knowledge, which is simply defined as all non- explicit
knowledge and is interwoven with the term tacit
knowledge [13].
Davenport and Prusak [12] describe knowledge as
a mix of experiences, contextual information, values,
and expert insights. Within organisations, this becomes
embedded not only in document repositories but also in
routines, processes, and practices. In contrast, Fahey and
Prusak [19] argue the importance of creating a shared
context. The starting point of “managing knowledge” is
to convey the shared context between the individuals
participating in knowledge sharing. However, a lack of
trust impacts the willingness to share information
between stakeholders while, conversely, the sharing of
tacit knowledge can be induced by trust [7].
We can synthesise the abovementioned literature in
a simple dynamic model (Figure 1). Where a body of
knowledge is divided into tacit and explicit knowledge.
There is a flow of knowledge being codified from tacit
to explicit, and there is explicit knowledge that is lost
and reverted to tacit knowledge.

Figure 1. Classic tacit / explicit division
To give two practical examples from the NZ real
estate industry, the Red arrow in Figure 1 indicates the
flow of tacit to explicit knowledge: the real estate agent
voices that the house situated on a cliff face has been
there for 40 years and has never moved. A geo-tech

engineer makes this explicit by testing the land and
providing a detailed report on potential problems.
Conversely, the Blue arrow indicates the flow of explicit
to tacit knowledge; when a house is sold but the
warranties are not transferred to the new owner. The
explicit information is lost and becomes tacit.

2.2 Knowledge asymmetry in HVLFT
Knowledge sharing in a competitive environment
has its own set of challenges. Stakeholders participating
in a HVLFT often face the issue of information and
knowledge asymmetry. Asymmetric information and
knowledge are broad domains and have been of concern
from the very origins of humanity. There have been
many approaches to obtain a fairer outcome of
transactions. One of the earliest on record is the envyfree cake cutting techniques based on “divide and
choose” as described in the Bible (Book of Genesis,
Chapter 13). Economists have discussed the asymmetric
information problem since the eighteenth century [22,
35]. An asymmetric information taxonomy was
formalised in the 70s through several prominent
contributions. Akerlof [1] describes the negative
financial impact that information discloser has on a
transaction from a seller's perspective. The taxonomy is
further extrapolated by three models underpinning the
behavioural experience between the sender and receiver
of asymmetric information. First, we have the Adverse
Selection Model proposed by Rothschild and Stiglitz
[47]. It is still used in economics, insurance, and risk
management today, portraying the seller having more
information than the buyer. Second, the Moral Hazard
Model explains the change in the behaviour of a buyer
or a seller due to the lack of perceived risk [27]. Finally,
Spence [50] describes two parties that have access to
different information signified by the Signalling Model
— observing the knowledge gap between an
organisation and a job applicant.
In the quest to finding the best negotiation
tactic/strategy in an environment dominated by
asymmetric information, a fundamental principle of
game theory was developed, and aptly named the
revelation principle [18]. This principle was founded on
the agent being incentivised, to tell the truth [30, 39].
This principle provides the discovery of the best
negotiation mechanism in the least amount of time.
Opposing the revelation theory is the Bayesian game
theory. This theory relies on negotiating agents having
incomplete information [37, 39]. Under the Bayesian
game theory and the auction strategy, selling an object
and trying to maximise the return from multiple buyers
is valid from a seller's perspective [38]. Various types of
auctions can be used, e.g., English, Dutch, and Sealed
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bid [45]. The Bayesian game theory is currently the
modus operandi for most HVLFT [1].

2.3 The dark side of knowledge
The dark side of knowledge is conceptualised as an
unwillingness to share information so as not to lose a
competitive advantage [48]. The dark side of knowledge
management and the unethical motives that endanger
capturing knowledge include distortion (e.g.
manipulating specific knowledge in favour of particular
interests, viewpoints, or beliefs); suppression (e.g.
creating obstacles and using the knowledge that is
contrary to particular interests); and misappropriation
(e.g. modification, theft, or inappropriate revelation of
knowledge) [3]. In a transaction with multiple unaligned
stakeholders, the dark side needs to be understood on
how it could influence the information shared among
them. If we focus on the dark side of knowledge in the
context of a HVLFT, then we need to understand the
interplay between the different stakeholders within a
transaction.
In addition, sticky knowledge and leaky knowledge
are two other important concepts that characterise
knowledge sharing. There are two schools of thought on
the stickiness of knowledge. One is the educational view
that knowledge stickiness measures the knowledge that
retains with the student. And the other is the
management view of sticky knowledge that occurs when
tacit knowledge is difficult to codify and transfer [20].
For knowledge surrounding HVLFT, we will adhere to
the management view of sticky knowledge.
Motivational barriers to knowledge transfer are well
known in the management literature [28]. Resistance to
change, competitive advantage, job protection, and lack
of incentives are potential barriers; and transfer of
knowledge is often laborious, time- consuming, and
challenging [51]. Within an organisation, stickiness is
exacerbated by the difficulties in that process of
transferring knowledge [51]. Knowledge leakage occurs
when information seeps out of the system, causing
knowledge to be lost. For a HVLFT, it is important to
distinguish the difference between the dark side of
knowledge and knowledge leakage. The main difference

is that the leakage of information is an unintentional loss
of knowledge, and the dark side is the intentional misuse
of knowledge. To use a metaphor, we see information
flowing through plumbing pipes between stakeholders.
The stickiness causes blockages in the flow, often
through time and changing stakeholders; and the
leakage is the loss of information [15]. The literature
makes a distinction of other concepts of knowledge
apart from the classic tacit and explicit divide, as
described above. Also, the understanding, experience,
and learning are important considerations in a HVLFT.
The different forms of such knowledge (data,
information, knowledge, wisdom, understanding,
experience, and/or learning) which is neither tacit nor
explicit, we deem as belonging to knowledge dimension
X. More formally we define knowledge in dimension X
as tacit or explicit knowledge that has now been lost,
distorted,
suppressed,
misrepresented,
or
misappropriated resulting in ambiguity and increased
risk in decision making.

3. The Case Study
3.1 Background
The primary research instrument was an
exploratory case study using semi-structured interviews.
According to Yin [52], identifying the unit of analysis
and the “key” participants are vital to a case study
design. The unit of analysis was the NZ real estate
industry. During the pilot study, six main categories of
stakeholders were identified: buyer, seller, real estate
agent, government, lawyer, and specialist. The NZ
residential real estate has all the characteristics of a
HVLFT. The stakeholders mentioned above have all the
characteristics needed to understand the three research
questions: 1) what asymmetric information in a HVLFT
is, 2) what causes asymmetric information in a HVLFT,
and 3) how we counterbalance asymmetric information
in a HVLFT. The steps undertaken in the interview
process are presented in Figure 2 and discussed in the
following section.

Figure 2: Steps in the interview process
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3.2 Process
This qualitative case study allows exploratory
research into an industry and to build a theory on the
current situation from within, utilising deductive and
inductive process to formalise the theory [16].
Step 1: A questionnaire was designed to understand
the viewpoint of the stakeholders involved in a
residential real estate transaction in NZ. The base
questionnaire focussed on the decision-making process
within a transaction between a buyer and a seller. For
the other stakeholders, a personalised version of the
questionnaire was developed, which focus on their
specific role within the transaction.
Step 2: Semi-structured interviews were conducted
at a place of the participants choosing. Due to the
COVID 19 lockdown, most of the interviews were
conducted using Zoom the video conferencing
application.
Step 3: Each interview was transcribed and
returned to the participant in order to check for
inaccuracies or privacy breaches. If amendments were
made they were returned to the participants to recheck.
This reiterative process was completed once the
participants agreed that the data could be used for the
intended research purpose.
Step 4: Initial nodes were developed for responses
from the participants that aligned with three main
themes (a) the three research questions (b) the phases of
the Decision Making Process Model [25] and (c) the
TEX Model.
Step 5: The nodes were populated by the responses
(answers and statements) given by the various
participants. The text was highlighted and collated with
the nodes using practical examples and responses of
agreeing or disagreeing with the above- mentioned
themes.
Step 6: The text was analysed a second time
extracting nodes that were outside the scope of the three
described themes. Highlighting differences in
geographical location, perceived risk, emotional
responses, decision making, and processes that needed
to be improved. Also, the text highlighted in step 5 was
used for multiple nodes where applicable.
Step 7: Patterns were established, new nodes were
aggregate and new themes developed.
Step 8: The responses per node were summarised
and the responses per participant collated as
“favourable/against/ neutral”. A framework of
stakeholders and their responses per theme was created.
Step 9: New models were developed, and current
models reaffirmed or refined.

3.3 Sample Size

There is a low level of transparency regarding
sample sizes in an industry-wide case study [6, 33].
Often, authors suggest that saturation needs to be
achieved, inferring that the addition of more
stakeholders did not add anything to the analysis. Mason
et al. [33] research on 429 doctoral theses found the
mode was 25 participants. Malterud et al. [31] propose
the concept of “information power” to ascertain the
sample size needed for a qualitative study. The higher
the information power is the smaller the sample size can
be. Information power is determined by five criteria;
represented in Table 1.
Combining the findings from Mason et al. [33] and
Malterud et al. [31], our sample size was 31 participants.
Initially, the number of participants was variable
depending on the representation of the various voices
within a group of stakeholders and dictated by the
saturation point of new insights gained [36].
Criteria Info
Power
Aim of the
study
Sample
specificity
Use of theory
Quality of
dialog
Analysis
strategy

HVLFT in NZ Real Estate

Sample
Size

Narrow (HVLFT)
Dense (Expertise)
Applied / Theoretical
Strong (Experience)
Cross Case (Different Fields)

Table 1: Change in information power

3.4 Stakeholders
Identifying and selecting the stakeholders followed
a structured approach to secure a representative sample.
1. For the buyers, a mix of novice (first-time) and
experienced (more than 5 properties purchased)
buyers were selected. Also, a combination of rural
and urban backgrounds were included to provide an
in-depth picture.
2. For the seller, a mix of novice (first-time) and
experienced (more than 5 properties sold) sellers
were selected. Also, a combination of rural and
urban backgrounds were included to provide an indepth picture.
3. The real estate agent had a minimum of 10 years’
experience. Such experience provided insights into
changes that occurred in the industry over time.
And, a plethora of practical examples of the
possible misuse of asymmetric information
between buyer and seller.
4. Government participants with knowledge of
council requirements, which are linked to the
resource management act (RMA), were selected.
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This information is crucial in purchasing a property
in NZ.
5. A lawyer who operated in the rural context and one
that operated in an urban context were selected.
Both specialised in conveyancing and had more
than 10 years’ experience.
6. A mortgage specialist who could provide insights
into the financial impact of purchasing a property
was selected.
7. Specialists were selected who are commonly
requested to produce reports and services that are
linked to a property sale.
To generalise these stakeholders beyond the NZ
real estate market we aligned the main stakeholder
categories with the Governance, Risk and Compliance
(GRC) model [44]. We further divided the seven main
stakeholders into smaller sub- categories, which also
aligned with the GRC model, as shown in Table 2.

transcribed. Codes were used to assign meaning to the
descriptive information compiled during the study [34].
The qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) was
utilised to explore asymmetric information in HVLFT,
the causation of asymmetric information in HVLFT, and
how asymmetric information in HVLFT can be
counterbalanced. The coding process was supported by
procedural memos to keep track of any changes in the
thematic nodes [9].
The NZ residential real estate industry was used to
scope the case study and view the phenomena of
asymmetric information in a HVLFT through the eyes
of participants. Realising the pitfalls of the
dramaturgical model [21], the follow-up questions
asked during the interview process produced the most
explanatory data. Eliciting the stakeholders to provide
their un-reserved opinions, consequently captured
unanticipated information [17]. Listening to the
subliminal meaning behind statements and reflecting
back to deepen the conversation ensured that the
meaning was understood [8]. The developed
questionnaire was a guide to the interview allowing the
researcher to switch between questions and ask
supplementary questions to gain a deeper understanding
on the participant’s specific expertise.

3.6 Interview Process

Table 2: Stakeholders interviewed

3.4 Data Collection
Participants were asked open-ended questions and
encouraged to describe situations in significant detail.
They were allowed to ask questions to clarify the posed
questions. The estimated time per interview was
between 20 and 30 minutes, however, the duration was
extended when new insights were being uncovered. The
semi-structured interviews were recorded and

The structure focused on the decision-making
process and what information was needed to support this
process.
• Decision-making process of a buyer/seller on the
abstract level (macro)
• Decision-making process of a buyer/seller on a
detailed level (micro)
• Negotiation process
• Information gathering process
• Trusting the information received from the different
stakeholders
• Procedure how information is provided
• Technologies used to gather information and
support a decision
• Data that is relied upon to make a decision
The questionnaire was specifically designed for the
three main categories; buyer, seller, and real estate
agent. For the other categories, tailor-made additional
questions were drafted per participant to understand
their specific role in the process.
The questions were designed to understand the
phenomena of asymmetric information in a HVLFT
from the perspective of the various stakeholders
involved. Focussing on the social construct of how the
stakeholders view a HVLFT [36].
As mentioned, the data was collected through semistructured interviews. The developed questionnaire was
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a guide to the interview allowing the researcher to
switch between questions and ask supplementary
questions to gain a deeper understanding of the
participant’s responses and expertise. Two categories of
questions were asked about (a) the current process and
their perceptions on the quality of information and (b)
potential future scenarios that address some of the
current problems by leveraging appropriate technology.
Current description of processes and perceptions of
information quality:
• How they gather relevant information to support
their decision.
• How they choose their information sources
• How they determine the market price
• How accurate they perceive the information to be
• How they trust the information received
• How they choose a property
• How they negotiate
• Potential procedural and technological responses
that overcome current problems:
• How they would challenge potential mistakes made
in the process
• How they would improve the process
• How technology can support their decision
• How they would like to receive the information
needed
The participants were initially selected through
personal networks and further recruitment through a
snowballing process during the interviews. The
participant received an invitation email with the
participant information sheet (PIS) and a consent form
(CF). Due to the COVID 19 Level 4 lockdown, all
interviews were conducted through video conferencing
(Zoom). The interviews were recorded via video (mp4)
and audio (mp3). We recognise that video recording led
to a more structured response from the participant,
eliminating the noise that a face to face interview has.
This, in-turn shortened the interview process by
approximately 15 minutes (20 to 40 minutes). The
interview was then transcribed. All the participant
personal information was deleted, and their name
replaced by a code. A copy was sent via email to the
participants with a personal email thanking them and
requesting them to check the transcript and comment on
anything they do not want to be disclosed. We noticed
in the initial interviews that the participants were very
aware of their reputation, and any “negative” remarks
made about other stakeholders in the industry were
asked to be deleted.
The transcripts were imported into NVIVO
software and auto coded per speaker. This provides the
possibility to focus on the responses from each
participant. Each transcript was coded line for line
finding statements made on the common themes
mentioned above. Also leaving room to code new and

unexpected information presented in the interview. The
participants also received a case classification on age
(20-39, 40-59, 60+), gender (male, female), and
geographical (urban, rural).

3.7 Data Analysis
The common themes between all stakeholders in a NZ
real estate transaction are:
• Misappropriation of information
• Lack of available explicit information on a specific
property
• Not understanding all the risks involved in
purchasing a property
• Flaws in the current process of purchasing a
property
• The financial implications in securing a property
• The rules and regulations faced by all experts
• Differences in the geographic area (urban, rural,
international)
• It allows the following nodes to be aggregated:
• Explicit Information (available) (Council Property
File, Legal (documentation), LIM Report, LINZ
(title info), Specialist Reports)
• Geographical (differences) (International, Rural,
Urban)
• Procedural Change (criticised or recommended)
(Council, Legal, Real Estate, Specialist)
• X (examples) (Fraud, Misinformation, Not
understood, Withheld Information)

4. Research Artefacts
4.1 TEX Model
Given the information gathered from the
interviews, and from personal experience, there is a
dimension missing in dividing a body of knowledge into
tacit and explicit. We call this new dimension
X. It aligns with the literature showing some forms
of knowledge that are not fully captured by the classic
tacit and explicit divide. Even if all information
associated with HVLFT is presented explicitly,
understanding them for a novice buyer can still be
challenging [14]. Due to the low- frequency purchasing
of high-value assets, the possibility of single, double, or
triple loop learning is less applicable [4] among
HVLFT. The terminology used by participants to
describe tacit, explicit, and X are gathered in Table 3. X
and its interactions with tacit and explicit are combined
with the characteristics and relevant authors are shown
in Table 4.

4.2 Application of TEX
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The flows are depicted in the Dynamic TEX Model
shown below in Figure 3 and illustrates the
transformations of the different types of knowledge at
the nexus/vortex between the tacit, explicit, and
X. The TEX model is proposed through a HVLFT lens,
and especially through the eyes of the stakeholders in
the real estate industry. The TEX model can be applied
to real estate transactions in NZ through the seven
stakeholders: seller, buyer, council, lawyer, agent,
banker, and specialist [25, 26]. Table 5 presents just a
few insights gained from the semi-structured interviews
held and provides a starting point to segment the various
stakeholders.

is rare. Since the seller often has the advantage of
asymmetric information [40], that could lead to suboptimal decision making by the buyer. Besides from
real [43, 46], asymmetric information and knowledge
in a transaction have been studied in other contexts [1,
24] and business process design [49].

As mentioned before, the chance for having single,
double or triple loop learning for the buyer in HVLFT
is low because the opportunity to reflect on a mistake

Sticky Knowledge

E => X

Leaky Knowledge
Leaky Knowledge
*Distort

T => X
E => X
T/E => X

Dark side of
Knowledge

Transformation Characteristics

*Suppress

T/E => X

* Mis-appropriate

T/E =>X

Tacit

Easy to codify

Hard to codify

X
Lack of
understanding
Unwillingness to
share

Easily
transferred
Easily
documented

Difficult to
share
Hard to
transfer
Hard to
document

Externalised

Internalised

Hidden

Structured

Human
interpretation

Profit-driven

Objective

Subjective

Slanted

Rational

Cognitive

Loss of knowledge

Understandable
Context
independent
Challengeable
knowledge

Teachable
Dynamically
created
Hard to legally
challenge

Misinformation
Creation of
obstacles

Easy to share

Figure 3. Dynamic TEX model

Description

Explicit

Misappropriation
Modification

Fraud

Table 3. Terminologies used for TEX

Authors / Considerations

The knowledge that is hard or impossible to transfer into explicit
knowledge
Tacit knowledge is lost over time
Explicit knowledge is lost (inadvertently)
Manipulating specific knowledge in favour of particular interests,
viewpoints, or beliefs
Creating obstacles and using the knowledge that is
contrary to particular interests
Modification, theft, or inappropriate revelation of
knowledge
Not understanding explicit and/ or tacit information. Unable to
make an informed decision
Unable to adjust actions, assumptions, or context due to the low
frequency of specific transactions
Understanding on a specific body of knowledge increases

Szulanski (2000)

Argyris & Schon (1974)
Increased fines for
misinformation, Anti-money
laundering bill
Blockchain, web
applications, IoT
Owners information
registered, warranties linked

Educational

T/E => X

Learning

T/E => X

Educational

X => T/E

Learning

X => T/E

Government Response

X => E

Understanding the risk in a HVLFT
Regulations to improve the reliability of the information
provided. Through regulations or sanctions

Technological Response

X => T/E

Systems to support a HVLFT

Procedural Response

X => T/E

Procedures in place to support government and
technological responses

Ferdinand & Simm (2006)
Alter (2006)
Seidl (2007)
Seidl (2007)
Jones, et al. (1980)
Duguid (2005)
Dreyfus (2004)

Table 4. Knowledge flow between TEX dimensions

The information inequality should be addressed by
educating stakeholders about all three dimensions of the
TEX model. The buyer needs to understand the tacit and

explicit knowledge made available to them, and being
aware of the motivation behind others to misuse X. For
example, a novice real estate buyer presented with
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explicit knowledge such as technical drawing or report,
may not understand the implication of them to the
purchase of the property. This education layer is added
to the TEX Model as seen in Figure 4.
Stakeholder
Seller

Explicit

Tacit

X

Chattel list

Not disclosing
slippage
issues.

Buyer

Signed
contract

Council

Files, L.I.M,
consents

Minimum
price
willing to
accept
Maximum
price
willing to
offer
Explanation
of the files

Lawyer

Check
all
relevant
documents
Refer
to
council and
information
received from
the seller
Calculate the
monthly
payment
Develop
a
report

Agent

Banker
Specialist

Not discussing
development
opportunities

Personal
opinions

Files
not
available,
Council errors
Fee
transparency

Paints a
tacit picture
of a
property

Withholding
information if
that
could
negate the sale

Sell their
service

Not compare
every
mortgage
Not liable for
their report.

Sell their
service

Table 5: Examples of TEX per Stakeholder

Figure 4: TEX model flows
Given the characteristics of HVLVT, blockchain
could be a suitable solution to address several of our
concerns. For example, verifiable information could be
stored onto some permissioned blockchain. This could
address the issue of information asymmetry in many
ways. First, all information would be time- stamped,
situating the data in a historical context. Second,
information would be verifiable since it will only be
entered through trusted nodes. Third, it can give legal
standing to the buyer if the information used to make a
purchase decision was incorrect. Fourth, the same

information previously collected does not have to be
repeatedly sourced again, thus saving time and money.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
A poignant remark made by one participant is that
councils in NZ have a bad reputation in archiving all the
information on houses in their area. To evade this
criticism councils often apologise by stating they have
had a “fire in their records.” In the meantime, nearly
every council office at some point has experienced this
“fire”. This is a classic example of explicit information
being lost. Throughout the interviews, there have been
numerous examples of information flowing between the
various TEX dimensions. Figure 5 summarises the
remarks gathered from the case study on the information
flow between T, E and X dimensions.
The problem that arises is the motivational aspect
of the stakeholders to participate in the information
exchange on the blockchain. We need to understand
their financial loss or gain in sharing information and
list motivations per stakeholder to share verifiable
information and how we can verify this information.
Initially, from the seven stakeholders, only two benefit
directly from the introduction of blockchain. The
council increases its detailed information per household.
The buyer lowers his cost in the due diligence process
and benefits from the increased amount of verifiable
data. We believe the government would need to be the
catalyst to drive change in this space and motivate other
stakeholders to change their behaviour. As mentioned,
reducing both risk and initial cost in a transaction is the
driving force. Counterbalancing the asymmetric
information and increasing the knowledge and trust on
the asset to be transacted, would be the largest
contributors to risk reduction.
As an incentive for the seller to participate in the
transparency of the asset, the reduction of risk could
have a positive impact on the sales price. There is a
correlation between risk and the price a buyer is willing
to offer. A buyer will counteract the risk by building in
a margin to offset the perceived risk [29]. There is also
a motivation for the specialist involved if we can
convince seller before listing their property to acquire
and register the reports on the blockchain to present an
in-depth picture of their asset, thus reducing the buyer's
risk. If we can motivate the buyer and seller to utilise
blockchain for information sharing and use government
as an initiator, we can counterbalance information
asymmetry in HVLFT.
As illustrated in Figure 5 we view the knowledge
and information flows between the various stakeholders
as potential contributors to asymmetric information. If
we can focus our procedural and technological
responses on these information flows, we can reduce
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information asymmetry in a HVLFT. From the case
study we have identified and discussed two main
contributors towards asymmetric information in a
HVLFT (X, noise, and education). In a HVLFT there are
also a number of subtle contributors that influence
asymmetric information in a positive or negative way
(i.e. honesty, trust, financial gain,). These subtle
contributors could be incorporated in a system dynamics
model, namely a stock and flow diagram (Figure 6).

This model enables us to modify the input and present
the results in an interface to visualize the degree of risk
associated with a HVLFT. Quantifying the amount of
risk that is acceptable would require further research.
This would increase our understanding of what
contributes to asymmetric information and in how we
could be observant of other factors that contribute
towards asymmetric information.

Figure 5: Information flow between dimensions based on participants remarks

Figure 6: Stock and Flow Diagram Modifying and Visualizing Risk in Asymmetric Information
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